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In the present experiments, I evaluated effects of antecedent- and consequent-based 
manipulations on cooperation and productivity in a novel group work task.  Participants worked 
in three-person teams on a computer-based task where they could allocate time toward scoring 
points or assisting teammates.  In both experiments, teams were assigned to a restricted (no 
communication allowed during trials) or unrestricted (communication allowed throughout the 
experiment) communication condition.  In Experiment 1, two teams participated and completed 
the task in 180-s trials for one of three incentive types: (a) fixed incentive, delivered independent 
of performance; (b) individual incentive, delivered based on individual score; and (c) collective 
incentive, based on team total score and divided equally amongst teammates.  Probability of 
incentive delivery also varied and was set to 10% or 100%.  I conducted Experiment 2 in a 
similar manner with eight teams, the fixed and individual incentive types only, and incentive 
probability was always 100%.  Cooperative response requirement also increased across six levels 
within each trial for both experiments.  In Experiment 1, the team in the unrestricted condition 
engaged in more cooperative responses and was more productive than the team in the restricted 
condition.  No main effects of incentive type manipulations were observed, potentially due to the 
multiple condition types.  Results of Experiment 2 did not replicate the effect of the 
communication manipulation.  However, participants engaged in fewer cooperative responses 
and were more productive in the individual incentive condition than in the fixed condition.  
Finally, demand curve analyses were used to evaluate responding across response requirements.  
Findings demonstrate the utility of the current methodology for examining variables that 
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Cooperation and Productivity in a Simulated Small Group Work Task 
Applied behavior analysis is the application of scientific principles of behavior to 
improve behaviors of social significance (Baer, Wolf, & Risley, 1968).  Applied behavior 
analytic techniques have been effectively been used to solve problems of societal importance 
across a wide range of contexts, including autism (e.g., Lovaas, 1987), developmental disabilities 
(e.g., Neidert, Dozier, Iwata, & Hafen, 2010), education (e.g., Barnett, Daly, Jones, & Lentz, 
2004), gerontology (Baker, Fairchild, & Seefeldt, 2015; Burgio & Burgio, 1986), substance use 
and addiction (e.g., Higgins et al., 1991), gambling (e.g., Nastally & Dixon, 2012), social work 
(e.g., Thyer, 1999), and others.  One sub-discipline of applied behavior analysis, organizational 
behavior management (OBM; Wilder, Austin, & Casella, 2009), has been particularly successful 
at using behavior analytic principles to improve employee performance.  Work is the single 
activity toward which Americans devote the most amount of time (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
2017) and, thus, employee performance and related areas are socially significant issues. 
 The three primary areas of OBM are behavioral systems analysis (Diener, McGee, & 
Miguel, 2009), behavior-based safety (Boyce & Geller, 2001), and performance management 
(Daniels & Bailey, 2014).  Behavioral systems analysis refers to an approach that treats 
organizations as behavioral systems, or groups of interrelated components with a shared goal.  
With this approach, various components of an organization, and their interactions with one 
another, are assessed and interventions are implemented to create more efficient processes.  
Behavior-based safety is a focused application of OBM that uses behavior analytic principles to 
modify work environments and employee behavior to increase safe behavior and reduce injuries 
in the workplace. 
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The third area of OBM is performance management, which is a system of management 
that uses principles of behavior analysis to change employee behavior to help produce 
meaningful outcomes for the organization.  Performance management differs from the other two 
areas of OBM in that it is employee focused; whereas, in behavioral systems analysis, employees 
represent only one level of analysis, and performance management targets a broader set of 
behaviors than behavior-based safety interventions (Wilder et al., 2009). 
Performance Management Interventions 
 Performance management interventions begin by first identifying a particular 
performance problem and the environmental variables that are likely contributing to the problem 
with a performance assessment (Austin, 2000).  One popular assessment technique is the 
Performance Diagnostic Checklist (PDC; Austin, 2000), which is a semi-structured interview 
that can be conducted with managers and staff to pinpoint target behaviors and their controlling 
environmental variables.  Following assessment, techniques to address the performance problem 
can be classified into either antecedent or consequent interventions. 
 Antecedent interventions involve manipulating factors of an employee’s environment 
prior to when a desired behavior occurs to increase the likelihood that the behavior will occur.  
Types of antecedent interventions commonly used in organizational settings include goal setting 
(e.g., Fellner & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1984), task clarification (e.g., Tittlebach, DeAngelis, Sturmey, & 
Alvero, 2007), job aides (e.g., Slowiak, Madden, & Mathews, 2006), and response effort 
manipulations (e.g., Casella et al., 2010).  These interventions share a common feature that the 
manipulation is not made to the reinforcement contingency, but rather it helps prompt desirable 
behavior to make it more likely that the employees will contact reinforcement contingencies that 
occur in their natural environment.  Training is typically also considered a form of antecedent 
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intervention.  Training interventions often use a behavioral skills training framework 
(Miltenberger, 2015; Parsons, Rollyson, & Reid, 2012), which consists of delivery of 
instructions, modeling the desirable behavior, and rehearsal and feedback until the trainee 
demonstrates competent performance. 
 Consequent interventions involve manipulations to workplace contingencies and include 
performance feedback and incentives.  Performance feedback (or feedback) is the delivery of 
information to an individual about his or her past performance that allows the individual to 
improve performance on the task (Daniels, 2016).  Although the underlying functional 
mechanisms of feedback are largely unknown (see Duncan & Bruwelheide, 1985; Peterson, 
1982), feedback is often considered a consequent intervention (e.g., Sigurdsson, Ring, & 
Warman, 2018) and is one of the most frequently studied interventions amongst organizational 
researchers (VanStelle et al., 2012).  In reviews of feedback research, Balcazar, Hopkins, and 
Suarez (1985) and Alvero, Bucklin, and Austin (2001) reported that feedback has been 
demonstrated to be effective across numerous behaviors, and several variables may affect 
feedback effectiveness including content, frequency of delivery, the medium through which it is 
delivered, how accurate it is, and whether it is delivered in group or individual contexts. 
 Incentives—another type of consequent intervention—are rewards delivered in the 
workplace contingent on desirable behavior.  Incentives are often monetary (Bucklin & 
Dickinson, 2001; Daniels & Bailey, 2014), but can also take the form of non-monetary tangible 
items (e.g., food; Kortick & O’Brien, 1996) or activities, such as time off from work (e.g., 
Austin, Kessler, Riccobono, & Bailey, 1996).  The use of monetary incentives dates to the early 
1900s, when incentive systems were designed based on Frederick Taylor’s contributions to the 
practice of scientific management (Milkovich & Stevens, 1999, 2000).  Taylor originally 
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designed incentives systems using an assumption from traditional economic theory that workers 
are completely rational (e.g., Persky, 1995) and, thus, would be most productive when wages are 
proportionally tied to productivity (Milkovich & Stevens, 2000).  The prevalence of those early 
incentive systems decreased due in large part to various social, economic, and political factors 
occurring in the mid-20th century (Peach & Wren, 1991).  Further, economic and psychological 
research findings suggesting that humans do not behave in a perfectly rational manner (e.g., 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) suggest that Taylor’s incentive systems may not have been as 
sustainable as originally suggested.  However, presently, monetary incentives have returned to 
being one of the most prevalent types of pay systems (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001), with 
approximately half of United States companies using monetary incentives as one method to pay 
employees (e.g., Gross, 1995).  This renewed popularity of monetary incentives is likely due to 
several factors including changes in federal tax law (e.g., Revenue Act of 1978; Milkovich & 
Stevens, 2000), changes in business practices that led to an increased emphasis on productivity 
(Milkovich & Stevens, 2000), and increased research evidence improving the effectiveness of 
incentives (see Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001). 
 The efficacy of monetary incentives has been well documented in both laboratory and 
field studies which have consistently found that individuals are more productive when they 
receive incentives tied to their performance than when paid using fixed, hourly wages (e.g., 
Allison, Silverstein, & Galante, 1993; Wagner & Bailey, 1998).  Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, and 
Shaw (1998) conducted a meta-analysis of 39 laboratory experiments, laboratory simulations, 
and field experiments published between 1960 and 1996 and found that use of individual 
incentives was significantly correlated with performance quantity across all study contexts.  
Ultimately, the effects of monetary incentives can lead to large financial gains when applied 
5 
 
within organizations.  For example, Dierks and McNally (1987) reported that an individualized 
monetary incentive program for 485 bank employees produced a 200-300% increase in 
productivity relative to employees working for an hourly wage.  Notably, the incentive system 
used by Dierks and McNally accounted for only 10% of the employees’ payroll—the balance 
was paid as a flat hourly rate.  The success that Dierks and McNally observed with using a low 
percentage of pay earned through incentives is consistent with findings from several laboratory 
studies, which found little difference in productivity as a function of varying percentage of pay 
earned through incentives (e.g., Dickinson & Gillette, 1994; Frisch & Dickinson, 1990; Riedel, 
Nebeker, & Cooper, 1988; cf. Oah & Lee, 2011).  These findings suggest that performance 
increases associated with incentive delivery are primarily due to the presence of the incentive 
contingency, not the percentage of incentive pay relative to base pay (Poling, Dickinson, Austin, 
& Normand, 2000). 
 Along with individual incentives, many organizations deliver monetary incentives to 
groups, or teams, of employees (e.g., Gross, 1995).  Most of the research on group incentives has 
been conducted with small teams of 2-12 members (Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999).  In 
a review of the literature comparing small-group and individual incentives, Honeywell-Johnson 
and Dickinson (1999) reported that, in most studies reviewed, both incentive types produced 
comparable improvements in performance (e.g., Farr, 1976; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989).  
Further, in a meta-analysis of 45 studies and surveys, Stolovitch, Clark, and Condly (2002) found 
that group incentives increased performance by an average of 45%, whereas individual 
incentives increased performance by an average of 27%.  In addition, group incentives are often 
perceived to be more satisfying and fair than individual incentives (e.g., Honeywell, Dickinson, 
& Poling,1997).  Satisfaction with the incentive structure may be an important consideration as 
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some research findings suggest that individual incentives may lead to increased stress about 
financial instability and may be detrimental to employees’ overall well-being (see Ganster, 
Kiersch, Marsh, & Bowen, 2011). 
Structurally, group incentives are similar to individual incentives in that delivery of the 
incentive is certain, frequent, and contingent on clearly defined outputs for both incentive types 
(Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001; Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999).  Where the two incentive 
types differ is in the degree to which performance is directly tied to compensation.  In a group 
incentive arrangement, compensation is partially dependent on other group members’ 
performance, thus weakening the contingency between an individual’s performance and 
compensation.  This weakened contingency is an important consideration as some researchers 
have suggested that the complexity of work settings makes it difficult to evaluate the effects of 
incentives, even when they are delivered individually (e.g., Poling et al., 2000).  That is, various 
environmental and social factors present in a natural work setting weaken any contingency 
between performance and compensation, which may severely limit the effectiveness of a group 
incentive.  A final consideration with small-group incentives is the potential relations between 
incentive arrangement, performance, and a team’s social interactions.  Group-based incentives 
may promote increased cooperation amongst team members (Ganster et al., 2011), but few 
studies have directly evaluated the effects of incentive type on social interactions (Honeywell-
Johnson & Dickinson, 1999).  Thus, as suggested by Honeywell-Johnson and Dickinson (1999), 
more research is needed on the effects of social interactions on performance and the effects of 




 Inherent in the definition of OBM is an implication that nearly all OBM interventions 
focus on the analysis of behavior of individuals as they work together in groups.  Thus, an 
important consideration is how individuals’ behaviors are affected by their social behaviors, or 
their interactions with one another.  Social behavior, most broadly, has been described as “the 
behavior of two or more people with respect to one another or in concert with respect to a 
common environment” (Skinner, 1953, p. 297).  Skinner (1953) suggested that social behavior is 
made up of social episodes, or instances where one individual’s behavior is affected by another 
individual’s behavior.  These interactions between behaviors have also been termed interlocking 
behavioral contingencies, which are operant contingencies in which the behavior of one 
individual functions as an antecedent or consequent event for the behavior of another (Glenn, 
1988, 2004).  Interlocking behavioral contingencies produce an aggregate product, which, when 
applied at an organizational level, may be considered the goods or services that the organization 
produces (Camden & Ludwig, 2013).  Given that the majority of OBM research involves 
individuals working together in groups and that interactions between individuals affect the 
group’s aggregate product, social behaviors are an important area for OBM researchers to study. 
Taxonomy of social behavior.  One difficulty in studying social behaviors is that there is 
no common taxonomy for categorizing forms of social behavior into formal classes.  The 
terminology used to describe various classes of social behavior varies both between and within 
academic disciplines that study social interactions. 
One behavior analytic approach is offered by Schmitt (1998), who described three 
elementary forms of social behavior: cooperation, exchange, and competition.  Schmitt describes 
cooperation as instances in which a reinforcer is delivered to two or more individuals contingent 
on all individuals making a response.  Exchange is similar to cooperation in that both individuals 
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may receive a reinforcer.  However, with exchange, two individuals each can engage in a 
response that provides a reinforcer for the other individual.  A social interaction is described as 
exchange once each individual has provided the other with a reinforcer.  Finally, Schmitt defines 
competition as an instance in which reinforcers are delivered unequally based on some aspect of 
each individual’s performance (e.g., the individual with the highest score earns the most money).  
Schmitt’s classifications of forms of social behavior are similar to that of other behavior analysts 
with a few exceptions.  For example, Skinner’s (1953, 1962) definition of cooperation also 
includes a specification that one organism plays the role of a leader and the other a follower.  
Further, several studies (e.g., Hake, Olvera, & Bell, 1975; Hake & Vukelich, 1973) that 
examined responding under exchange contingencies used the term cooperation when referring to 
exchange. 
Various other terms to classify social behaviors are also used in experimental behavioral 
science research.  Tan and Hackenberg (2016) describe the behavior of rats working under a 
cooperative contingency for food as mutualism, or socially coordinated behavior that produces 
gains for both animals.  Relatedly, West, Griffin, and Gardener (2007) define mutualism as 
“cooperation between species” and cooperation as “behaviour that provides a benefit to another 
individual, and the evolution of which has been dependent on its beneficial effect for the 
recipient” (p. 416).  Another classification that may be used to describe a form of social behavior 
is altruism (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Jung-Kyoo Choi & Ahn, 2013), defined by West et al. as 
“a behaviour that is costly to the actor and beneficial to the recipient” (p. 416).  Finally, a social 
arrangement in which individuals share the responsibility of engaging altruistic behaviors, is 
referred to as reciprocal altruism or reciprocal exchange (e.g., Jimenez & Pietras, 2018). 
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Given the varied terms used to classify different forms of social behavior, the most 
precise approach may be to separate it into two broad categories: cooperation and competition.  
For the remainder of this paper, cooperative behaviors will be defined as behaviors that produce 
or facilitate the production of reinforcers for one or more members of a group.  Whereas, 
competitive behaviors will be defined as behaviors that produce disproportionate reinforcers in 
favor of the individual engaging in the behavior at the expense of other individuals in the group. 
Note that this definition of cooperation includes both cooperation and exchange as defined by 
Schmitt (1998). 
Experimental analyses of human social behavior.  Skinner (1953, 1962) provided one 
of the first demonstrations of a behavior analytic approach to studying social behavior when he 
reported on instances of shaping cooperative behavior between rats and competitive behavior 
between pigeons.  Following Skinner, several groups of researchers began to conduct 
experimental analyses of human social behavior.  This line of research evaluating social behavior 
contrasted with the work of many social psychology researchers of the time—who had primarily 
relied on correlational or interpretive methods—in the level of experimental rigor associated with 
each type of analysis (Lindsley, 1966).  That is, experimental analyses seek to establish 
functional control over an organism’s behavior; whereas, correlational or interpretive methods of 
analysis only seek to predict behavior (Lindsley, 1966; Sidman, 1960).  Where experimental 
analyses are especially useful in understanding social behavior is that this methodology allows 
researchers to parse out the separate effects of potential controlling variables in otherwise 
complex social arrangements.  Various methodological approaches have been taken to conduct 
experimental analyses of social behaviors, and they can generally be categorized into two 
groups: trial-based decision-making arrangements and free operant arrangements. 
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Trial-based decision-making arrangements.  Traditional approaches to evaluating 
cooperation and competition amongst humans often involve the use of trial-based choice 
arrangements, such as the prisoner’s dilemma (Axelrod, 1980) or public goods experiments (e.g., 
Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 2001; Jones & Rachlin, 2009).  With these types of arrangements, 
all participants on a team are simultaneously presented with a choice between a cooperative 
response and an alternative, selfish response (or a continuum of alternatives ranging from 
cooperative to selfish), and once all members of the team have chosen a response option, the 
results are displayed to the group.  Typically, the highest collective payout for the team occurs 
when all participants choose the cooperative option.  However, if one member chooses the 
selfish option (i.e., defects), that member will receive a higher individual payout while the 
remaining team members will receive a payout that is lower than if all members had cooperated.  
For studies evaluating social behavior, this process will then be repeated for successive trials 
with the same team members. 
Marwell and Schmitt (1972) used a prisoner’s dilemma arrangement to evaluate the 
effects of team size on cooperative behavior.  Participants were split into groups of two or three 
individuals, and each group completed 150 trials of the prisoner’s dilemma game.  Marwell and 
Schmitt used a traditional prisoner’s dilemma game for the dyads and a rationally equivalent 
version of the game that they modified to be used with the triads.  Specifically, each group 
member chose to either cooperate or defect for each trial.  If all group members chose to 
cooperate, each participant earned $0.08 for that trial.  If all group members chose to defect, each 
participant earned $0.04.  If one individual chose to defect and the other group member(s) chose 
to cooperate, the defecting individual earned $0.12 and the cooperating group member(s) earned 
$0.00 if in a dyad or $0.04 each if in a triad.  Finally, if one member chose to cooperate and the 
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other member(s) choose to defect, the cooperating individual earned $0.00 and the defecting 
member(s) earned $0.12 if in a dyad and $0.08 each if in a triad. 
Marwell and Schmitt (1972) provided participants with instructions on how to play the 
game as well as the outcome matrix.  Next, experimenters seated the participants in separate 
rooms such that they had no contact with other team members except for when the outcome was 
displayed to the group.  Results indicated that participants working in dyads made cooperative 
responses more than twice as often as those working in triads, thus suggesting that larger team 
sizes may have a negative effect on rates of cooperative responding.  Notably, this outcome is 
contradictory to that of a standard economic model which predicts that rates of cooperation 
would be equal between dyads and triads (due to the use of a rationally equivalent game design).  
Rather, Marwell and Schmitt (1972) suggest that rates of cooperation were likely lower amongst 
triads due to a decreased probability that all team members would select the cooperative option 
at the same time.  Thus, there is a decreased likelihood that participants will contact the 
reinforcement contingencies associated with cooperative responding.  However, it is also 
possible that these results are an artifact of the experimental arrangement, as cooperation is likely 
a function of the probability that all participants will choose the cooperation response at the same 
time. 
There are other limitations to using iterative choice-based arrangements to measure 
cooperation.  First, arrangements of this nature are trial-based and present an abstract 
experimental context that is very different from the free-operant nature of employees working in 
an organization.  Second, these arrangements typically have a fixed set of outcomes (a la the 
outcome matrix).  Participants may be more likely to shift responding to find an optimal level of 
responding; thus, producing a series of fixed patterns of responding.  Finally, these arrangements 
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typically involve the restriction of communication between team members.  Restricting 
communication eliminates many of the social aspects (e.g., verbal or nonverbal communication) 
that are often involved in the shaping and maintenance of social behavior. 
Free operant arrangements.  To address some of the limitations of trial-based choice 
arrangements, several methodological approaches have been developed to create a free-operant 
arrangement.  These arrangements allow for more naturalistic simulations of responding over a 
set period of time—as opposed to a set number of trials.  Many approaches for studying human 
cooperation were adapted from non-human animal methodologies and have evolved along 
several dimensions.  Notably, Hake and Vukelich (1972) outlined four procedural dimensions 
along which experimental analyses of cooperation may vary: dependency for reinforcement, 
deviations from reciprocity, group members as social stimuli, and availability of alternative 
responses.  In reviewing the published social behavior literature at that time, Hake and Vukelich 
described each of these dimensions as a continuum along which experimental procedures may be 
classified. 
Dependency for reinforcement.  The first area by which cooperation procedures may be 
categorized is the contingency for reinforcement.  On one end, a dependent contingency is one 
where one individual’s reinforcers are entirely dependent on another’s behavior.  For example, 
Sidowski (1957) paired college students into dyads and gave each student two buttons—one that 
provided points to a partner and one that delivered a brief shock.  On the other extreme of the 
reinforcement contingency dimension are experiments with an interdependent reinforcement 
contingency, which Hake and Vukelich (1972) describe as “whenever the responses of both 
individuals are necessary for, or can affect, the reinforcers of one individual” (p. 334).  This 
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interdependent contingency was demonstrated by Azrin and Lindsley (1956) in one of the first 
studies to evaluate cooperative behavior in humans from a behavior analytic perspective. 
Using a procedure first developed by Peters and Murphree (1954), Azrin and Lindsley 
(1956) sat two children on opposite sides of a table with a transparent screen in the middle.  Each 
child was given a stylus that fit into each of three holes at each end of the table.  The cooperative 
response was defined as both children placing their respective stylus into opposite holes within 
.04 s of each other.  Cooperative responses were reinforced with jelly beans provided to both 
children.  Using a reversal design, where cooperation was first reinforced, then placed on 
extinction, and then reinforced again, Azrin and Lindsley found that cooperative behavior was 
sensitive to contingencies of reinforcement in the same manner as individual, non-social 
behaviors. 
Deviations from reciprocity.  The second dimension along which cooperation procedures 
may be categorized is the degree to which the experimental preparation controls for reciprocity 
between participants.  Hake and Vukelich (1972) refer to reciprocity as an equal distribution of 
cooperative responses and reinforcers across all participants.  As such, one end of the continuum, 
response sharing, allows for no deviations from reciprocity as both participants are required to 
engage in the cooperative response in order to receive a reinforcer.  The procedures used by 
Azrin and Lindsley (1956) are an example of response sharing, as the participants were required 
to engage in the cooperative response at the same time to receive a reinforcer.  Thus, the 
distribution of responses and reinforcers was always equal between the partners.  An example of 
response sharing in the workplace may be if two employees are tasked with unloading and 
moving objects that are too large to carry alone.  In this example, neither individual can complete 
the task independently, so cooperative responses between the two individuals must be equal. 
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When a cooperation procedure allows for deviations from reciprocity such that there is an 
unequal distribution of cooperative responses or reinforcers, that procedure can be classified as 
response exchange.  Matthews (1977) developed a method for evaluating cooperation between 
pairs of individuals when opportunities for unequal response distributions were possible.  Pairs 
of undergraduate students were placed in individual rooms equipped with response panels 
through which all responses occurred.  During each session, participants could freely alternate 
between working alone and working with their partner by flipping a switch on the response 
panel.  If one or both participants chose to work alone, they could press a button on their 
response panel to receive $0.02 (with a 10-s timeout period after each button press).  If both 
participants opted to work together, one participant was randomly selected to “get” points first, 
while the other was selected to “give” points first.  Both participant’s panels displayed the work 
context (i.e., independent, give, or get), time remaining in the session, and each participant’s 
earnings for the session.  During periods of working together, the participant chosen to give 
could give the other participant $0.05 per button press (with a 10-s timeout); the receiver’s 
button presses had no effect.  The giver could also press an exchange button to swap “give-get” 
roles at any time.  Results indicated that response inequity typically was minimized throughout 
the session, suggesting that participants were switching roles frequently.  When a response cost 
for switching—both participants lost $0.01 per switch—was implemented some large inequities 
appeared during sessions, but the inequities were typically reduced by the end of the session.  
Finally, when the display no longer indicated time remaining, deviations from reciprocity were 
minimal throughout session. 
Partner as a social stimulus.  The third dimension along which cooperation procedures 
may vary is the degree to which a partner may serve as a discriminative stimulus for cooperation.  
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That is, procedures vary in whether observed behavior is under the control of social versus 
nonsocial stimuli.  On one end of the spectrum, the procedures used by Azrin and Lindsley 
(1956), where participants sat on opposite ends of a table and could see each other through a 
translucent screen, represents a social arrangement, as each individual’s behavior could be 
directly influenced by the other’s behavior. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum would be a nonsocial arrangement, the most extreme 
of which could be a situation where participants are completely unaware that they are working as 
part of a team.  For example, Burnstein and Wolff (1964) evaluated the degree to which 
individuals working in groups were sensitive to various reinforcement contingencies.  Burnstein 
and Wolff placed U.S. Army personnel into teams of three, with each team member in a separate 
room so they had no knowledge of the group context.  Each room was equipped with a response 
panel that had a response button and a light to indicate reinforcer deliveries.  Participants worked 
under a multiple schedule with different colored lights indicating whether the reinforcement 
contingency was a differential reinforcement of low- or high-rate behavior (notably, no rules 
about what the colors indicated were given).  These contingencies were collective, such that a 
single response from any group member contributed to the team’s response rate.  Results 
indicated that the teams met the contingency when reinforcers were delivered for short 
interresponse intervals, but not when long interresponse intervals were reinforced.  These results 
differed from data from two additional participants who completed the procedure individually.  
These findings suggest that when operating under an individual contingency, participants’ 
responding was sensitive to changes in contingencies without instructions; whereas, under a 
collective contingency, participants’ collective responding was not sensitive to changes in 
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contingencies when no instructions were given and when they did not know they were part of a 
team. 
Hake and Vukelich (1972) stated that the degree to which a partner serves as a social 
stimulus is an important consideration because these social stimuli may directly affect 
responding.  Specifically, cooperative responding may be influenced by (a) instructions delivered 
at the beginning of the trial, (b) contingencies of reinforcement, or (c) social stimuli which may 
function as other antecedent or consequent actions.  By providing no rules and removing all 
sources of social stimuli, Burnstein and Wolff (1964) demonstrated that contingencies alone 
likely are not responsible for controlling group behavior.  As such, cooperation procedures have 
typically involved informing team members that they are working together.  Several variations 
within this designation may apply.  For example, Schmitt and Marwell (1968) placed participants 
in separate rooms but informed them that they were working with a partner, and Hake and 
Vukelich (1973) had participants clearly engaging with one another’s experimental apparatus.  
One final area for consideration is whether participants can communicate with one another 
during the procedure.  It is possible that, in a cooperation arrangement, one partner may 
implement rules for the other to follow that are external to the experimental arrangement and 
may affect overall responsiveness to contingencies (e.g., Hackenberg & Joker 1994; Miller, 
Hirst, Kaplan, DiGennaro Reed, & Reed, 2014).  Hake and Vukelich provide support for the 
notion that communication may be an important variable by remarking that “preventing the 
communication and leadership behaviors in the present study might have affected the degree of 
reciprocity and the speed of acquisition of cooperative responding” (p. 14).  This suggestion, that 
access to communication increases rates of cooperative behavior, is also consistent with findings 
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of several studies that use trial-based decision-making arrangements to evaluate effects of 
communication on cooperation (Dawes, 1980, Sally, 1985). 
Alternative responses.  The final dimension through which Hake and Vukelich (1972) 
suggest cooperation procedures may be classified is whether an alternative response to 
cooperation is reinforced.  The arrangement initially used for cooperation procedures (Peters & 
Murphree, 1954; Skinner, 1953, 1962) featured the cooperative response as the only response 
option that could produce reinforcers.  For example, Lindsley (1966) set up an arrangement 
where two participants could only earn a reinforcer by pulling their respective plungers within 
0.5 s of one another. 
Hake and Vukelich (1973) demonstrated one of the first approaches to evaluating 
cooperative responding with an available alterative response.  They created an apparatus that 
involved two identical match-to-sample devices.  Each device consisted of a sample panel that 
connected to a matching panel.  The sample panel had a button which, when pressed, revealed 
the sample stimulus by illuminating one of three different colored light bulbs for 0.5 s.  The 
matching panel displayed each participant’s score and three response keys that corresponded to 
the three sample lights.  Participants were each assigned to one of the devices and earned a point 
by correctly matching the color displayed on their respective sample panel. 
Hake and Vukelich (1973) assigned participants, who were adults with disabilities, into 
pairs and provided individual training and instructions on how they could earn points, which 
could later be exchanged for money.  Participants were informed that they could press the button 
on their own sample panel or on their partner’s sample panel.  Thus, the cooperative response 
was defined as any time a participant revealed their partner’s sample stimulus, and the 
alternative, or individual, response was defined as any time participants revealed their own 
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sample stimulus.  The experimenters manipulated the effort required to emit a cooperative 
response by changing the distance between sample and matching panels.  In the initial condition 
(0 m), participants faced one another 6 m apart with their own matching and sample panels 
directly in front of them.  In this setup, participants could push the button on their own sample 
panel and respond on the matching panel without moving.  In subsequent conditions, the 
experimenters moved the sample panels further away from their respective matching panels and 
closer to the partner’s matching panel.  In the 3-m condition, the two sample panels were both at 
the midpoint between the two participants (the sample panel light always faced its respective 
matching panel).  Finally, in the 6-m condition, each participant’s sample panel was adjacent to 
their partner’s matching panel.  In sum, participants were provided with two response options: a 
cooperative response where participants revealed their partner’s sample stimulus and an 
alternative response where participants revealed their own sample stimulus. 
To evaluate if allocation of responding to the alternative response was sensitive to an 
antecedent manipulation, Hake and Vukelich (1973) manipulated the response effort required to 
engage in each response.  Results demonstrated that all pairs engaged in more cooperative 
responses than individual responses during the 0-m condition (highest effort for cooperation).  
During the 3-m condition, the majority of participants allocated most of their responding to the 
individual response, although some pairs engaged in more cooperative responses than individual 
responses.  Most participants favored the cooperative response during the 4.5-m condition, and 
all participants favored the cooperative response in the 6-m condition (lowest effort for 
cooperation).  Thus, Hake and Vukelich’s (1973) results were consistent with several other 
studies demonstrating that response allocation toward a cooperative versus alternative response 
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was sensitive to antecedent or consequent experimental manipulations (e.g., Marwell, Schmitt, & 
Shotola, 1971; Mithaug, 1969; Shimoff & Matthews, 1975). 
Limitations of free operant arrangements.  Although consistent effects of experimental 
manipulations on allocation of responding between cooperative and alternative responses have 
been found, there are some limitations in the generality of these findings.  In the extant literature, 
only a few levels of independent variables are evaluated in any given study.  Thus, we are 
limited in the degree to which patterns of responding may be used to develop a more thorough 
conceptual understanding of the parameters of variables that control social behavior. 
Social behavior and discounting.  One area of research—delay discounting—has 
conducted a more comprehensive analysis of social behavior using trial-based decision-making 
arrangements.  These iterative choice arrangements typically offer a more standardized approach 
than free operant methods, thus allowing for more analytic flexibility.  Several recent studies 
have evaluated the relation between participants’ choice to cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma 
game and their rate of delay discounting—the rate at which individuals discount monetary 
rewards as a function of increasing delay to its receipt (Harris & Madden, 2002; Yi, Buchhalter, 
Gatchalian, & Bickel, 2007; Yi, Johnson, & Bickel, 2005). 
For example, Yi, Johnson, & Bickel (2005) evaluated participants’ responding on a 
prisoner’s dilemma game when playing with a computer that simulated team members’ 
responses.  The computer selected the option to cooperate or defect either randomly or using a 
tit-for-tat strategy, where the computer selects the same decision that the partner made on the 
previous trial.  Yi et al. found that participants who chose the cooperative option more often 
during the tit-for-tat condition had lower rates of delay discounting than those who chose to 
defect more.  In addition, discounting rates were not correlated with response rates during the 
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random selection condition, suggesting that participants who discounted rewards less were more 
sensitive to contingencies on their own behavior.  Findings from this line of research are 
promising as they suggest that discounting research and, more broadly, research in the area of 
behavioral economics may be an effective approach toward increasing the generality and 
conceptual foundation of research findings on social behavior. 
Behavioral Economics 
 Behavioral economics1 is a subfield of behavior analysis that integrates principles from 
microeconomics and behavior analysis to better understand patterns of human choice (Hursh 
1980, 1984).  The incorporation and use of behavioral economic principles has helped produce 
gains in a range of areas of societal importance, including treatment of problem behavior 
exhibited by individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities (Gilroy, Kaplan, & 
Leader, 2018), education (e.g., Neef, Shade, & Miller, 1994), informing public policy (e.g., 
Hursh & Roma, 2013), assessing risky sexual behavior (e.g., Johnson & Bruner, 2012), treating 
drug and alcohol abuse (e.g., Bickel, Johnson, Koffarnus, MacKillop, & Murphy, 2014), 
gambling (e.g., Dixon, Marley, & Jacobs, 2003), and other potentially harmful behaviors (e.g., 
Becirevic, Reed, & Amlung, 2017, Lappalainen & Epstein, 1990).  Recently, several researchers 
have suggested that various areas of OBM research could benefit from the application of 
behavioral economic principles (e.g., Jarmolowicz, Reed, DiGennaro Reed, & Bickel, 2016; 
Roma, Reed, DiGennaro Reed, & Hursh, 2017; Sigurdsson, Taylor, & Wirth, 2013; Wine, 
Gilroy, & Hantula, 2012). 
                                                 
1 The term behavioral economics covers a broad range of disciplines (e.g., economics, cognitive 
psychology, neuroscience, behavior analysis) focused on accounting for irrational behavior, and 
the goals and theoretical and conceptual approaches used varies across these disciplines 
(Madden, 2000).  Behavioral economics as it is discussed in this paper is from a behavior 
analytic perspective.    
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Demand curve analyses.  One area of behavioral economics that may be useful for 
OBM researchers is the law of demand, which states that a commodity’s relative consumption 
will decrease when constraints, such as price of the commodity, increase (Samuelson & 
Nordhaus, 2009).  Demand curve analyses are a parametric approach to measuring and 
evaluating consumption of a commodity across a range of prices.  When graphed, a prototypical 
demand curve (e.g., Figure 1) plots consumption along the y-axis, prices along the x-axis, and a 
curve is fit to the data.  In accordance with the law of demand, consumption will decrease as 
prices increase.  Decreases in consumption are defined by two portions of the demand curve, 
inelastic and elastic demand.  Inelastic demand refers to the portion of the curve at relatively 
lower prices, where increases in price produce minimal decreases in consumption.  Elastic 
demand is defined by the portion of the curve where increases in price produce proportionally 
greater decreases in consumption.  Key metrics can be derived from demand curve analyses that 
provide measures of reinforcing efficacy and allow for quantitative comparisons across 
commodities.  Thus, demand curve analyses allow for extensive study of parameters that affect a 
single commodity as well as comparisons across commodities. 
Experimenters have utilized demand curve analyses to assess a range of commodities in 
human operant settings (e.g., Bickel & Madden, 1999) and with hypothetical arrangements 
(Jacobs & Bickel, 1999).  For example, Bickel and Madden (1999) evaluated relative reinforcing 
efficacy of cigarette puffs and money for four adult smokers.  The participants could pull 
plungers to earn three cigarette puffs or $0.20, and the number of responses required to earn each 
reinforcer increased across days.  The two reinforcers were first evaluated independently, and 
demand curves were fit to data on the number of reinforcers earned for the two commodities at 
each price.  Derived measures of reinforcing efficacy from demand curves were predictive of 
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participants’ preference for the reinforcers when they were presented concurrently at various 
prices, thus demonstrating the utility of demand curves as a measure of reinforcing efficacy. 
Jacobs and Bickel (1999) introduced a hypothetical purchase task (HPT), which extended 
the domains to which demand curves analyses can be applied.  The HPT involves evaluation of 
self-reported consumption of a given commodity when presented with a vignette outlining key 
contextual factors (e.g., presence or absence of potential consequences, availability of other 
commodities, timeframe within which commodities must be used).  Jacobs and Bickel observed 
systematic decreases in consumption as a function of increasing price that were consistent with 
human operant experiments.  Subsequent research has directly evaluated HPT validity (e.g., 
Amlung & MacKillop, 2015) and has found high correspondence between self-reported and 
observed consumption.  Because minimal risks, decreased time, and increased logistical 
feasibility are associated with administering HPTs, researchers have been able to assess a wider 
range of commodities than previously possible with human operant studies (e.g., Roma, Hursh, 
& Hudja, 2015). 
Several different mathematical methods have been used to quantify demand data (e.g., 
Hursh, Raslear, Bauman, & Black, 1989; Koffarnus, Franck, Stein, & Bickel, 2015; Yu, Liu, 
Collins, Vincent, & Epstein, 2014).  However, Hursh and Silberberg’s (2008) exponential model 
of demand is used often in contemporary research and will be the model discussed for the 
remainder of the paper. 
Behavioral economics in OBM.  When applying a behavioral economic framework to 
behavior in work settings, an incentive may be considered a commodity and its price may be the 
amount of work required to earn it.  In two recent studies, Henley and colleagues examined this 
framework by applying demand curve analyses to work performance.  Henley, DiGennaro Reed, 
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Kaplan, and Reed (2016) used a hypothetical work task—an adaptation of the HPT—to ask 
participants to indicate the likelihood they would pass out an increasing number of flyers for a 
$10 incentive.  Participants completed the survey under two conditions that varied in delay to 
payment (1 hour or 4 weeks).  Results indicated that demand was more elastic—participants 
were more sensitive to increases in response requirements—under the longer delay condition, a 
finding consistent with prior demand analyses evaluating the effect of delay (e.g., Hursh, 2014). 
In a second study, Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed, and Kaplan (2016) conducted a 
human operant experiment to assess sensitivity to increasing work requirements in a more 
naturalistic work setting.  Participants were employees of an online work platform (Amazon 
Mechanical Turk) who completed increasing amounts of analog work tasks for small monetary 
incentives ($0.05 or $0.10).  Demand curve analyses on workplace survival (i.e., the percentage 
of employees who were willing to complete the task at a given response requirement) 
demonstrated systematic decreases as work requirements increased, consistent with the extant 
literature involving demand curve analyses. 
These findings are promising as they lend support to the utility of applying a behavioral 
economic framework to improve performance in organizational settings.  For example, Henley, 
DiGennaro Reed, Reed, et al. (2016) demonstrated a method for assessing a workplace as a 
single unit by measuring employee survival at each response requirement.  Further, an employer 
could follow the methodology used by Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Kaplan, et al. (2016) to assess 
how delays to incentive delivery lead to decreases in optimal performance. 
Demand and social behavior.  Recently, Hursh and Roma (2013) demonstrated an 
extension of demand curve methodology to the study of social behavior.  Participants working in 
teams of three played a computer-based game for monetary rewards.  The game (named the 
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Team Performance Task; Emurian et al., 2011) created situations where participants were 
presented with a choice between scoring points for themselves or helping their teammates score 
points via a cooperative response.  Because cooperation and point scoring were mutually 
exclusive, Hursh and Roma conceptualized the time required to complete a cooperative response 
as a price of cooperation, where the price for cooperating was the opportunity cost of time that 
could have been spent scoring points.  The price of cooperation changed within each 
experimental trial, and participants completed a series of trials under various incentive 
conditions.  Cooperative responses at each price were examined using demand curve analyses.  
Results indicated that cooperative responses were sensitive to increases in price of cooperation in 
a manner consistent with demand curve analyses for other more commodities.  These findings 
provide support for the use of demand curve methodology in conducting parametric analyses of 
social behavior. 
Purpose 
 Despite the prevalent use of incentives in performance management interventions, our 
understanding of the differential effects of the contexts in which they are used is limited.  One 
key context, and the focus of this paper, is on the use of incentives with teams or groups of 
individuals working together; specifically, on the relation between incentive arrangements and 
cooperative behavior amongst teammates.  Although there is a considerable amount of literature 
on both group incentives and social behavior, this research has predominantly evaluated the two 
areas independently—and mostly by researchers working in separate domains of behavior 
analysis. 
In the present study I sought to synthesize literature on cooperation and group-based 
incentives within a behavioral economic framework.  For my experimental arrangement, I used a 
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second generation of Hursh and Roma’s (2013) Team Performance Task, a program named 
COHESION (Capturing Objective Human Econometric Social Interactions in Organizations and 
Networks).  A second aim of the present study was to assess the utility of the COHESION 
program for evaluations of variables that commonly affect workplace performance.  Experiment 
1 provided an evaluation of the COHESION program and associated methodology.  I assessed 
performance under different levels of a variety of potential controlling variables: (a) level of 
restriction of communication within teams, (b) probability of incentive delivery, and (c) 
incentive type.  Experiment 2 extended findings from Experiment 1 using a similar framework, 
but with a focus on restriction of communication and incentive type.  In addition, I used demand 
curve analyses to evaluate sensitivity to increases in cooperative response requirement under 
each experimental condition. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
 The purpose of Experiment 1 was to conduct a systematic replication and extension of 
Hursh and Roma’s (2013) methodology using the COHESION program.  The extension 
components included assessments of the effects of communication restriction and probability of 
incentive delivery.   
Participants and setting.  Participants for Experiment 1 were six female undergraduate 
students who were recruited from introductory courses in applied behavior analysis offered at a 
large Midwestern university.  Participants were recruited via in-class announcements—the script 
used for recruitment announcements is provided in Appendix A.  All methods for the experiment 
were approved by the university’s human subjects committee prior to recruitment.  Participants 
were assigned to two teams—in the order in which they signed up for the experiment—with 
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three participants in each team.  Participants were paid $10.00 plus any monetary incentives 
earned throughout the experimental session as compensation.  Compensation was delivered 
through the ClinCard program, a system that allows experimenters to make payments to 
participants through a rechargeable credit card.   
Data collection for each team occurred within a single 90-min visit, and the two teams 
participated on separate days within a 2-week time frame.  All sessions took place in a 4.6 by 
5.7-m room located on the university’s campus.  The layout of the room is shown in Appendix B.  
Two participants were seated on one side of the table, with the third participant on the opposite 
side.  All participants faced the center of the table, and the experimenter sat facing the three 
participants at the head of the tables.   
COHESION program, gameplay, and apparatus.  The COHESION program used for 
the experiment is a networked web application that operates over the Internet or a closed intranet 
and is designed to function across most devices (e.g., desktops, tablets, laptops), operating 
systems (i.e., Windows, macOS), and modern web browsers (e.g., Chrome, Safari, Firefox).  The 
COHESION server was written with the Ruby programming language (www.ruby-lang.org) and 
uses the Ruby on Rails framework (rubyonrails.org).   
Appendix C displays an annotated interface presented to participants during gameplay.  
All engagement took place within the square game board in the middle of the screen, and 
teammates simultaneously played using separate computers.  During gameplay, square boxes 
(resources) appeared one at a time in a random location along the outside of the square game 
board.  Participants could score points by using their mouse to click on a resource and drag it 
into the target square in the middle of the screen.  Participants earned one point for each resource 
that they moved to the target zone—a single resource was always available for each participant.  
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A score panel on the top left side of the screen displayed participants’ score (in points) for the 
trial.  Several barriers were randomly dispersed throughout the field, and if a resource made 
contact with a barrier, one point was deducted from the score.  Each team member had three 
barriers that only he or she could see, but all team members would lose points if they struck an 
invisible barrier with a resource.  That is, there were always nine barriers, and any group member 
could lose points for colliding a resource with a barrier whether it was visible or not.  Each team 
members’ barrier reveals were in random locations on team members’ game board.   
Each barrier had a lifespan of 10-15 s and, at the end of the lifespan, it would move to a 
new, randomly determined location.  An individual could reveal a barrier to other members of 
the team by clicking their mouse on a barrier and holding it for a given duration.  When 
participants start to reveal a barrier, a small yellow line appears and begins to form a circle 
around the outside of the barrier as an indication of how much time remains until it is revealed.  
Once revealed, a barrier was visible to all members of the team for the remainder of its lifespan; 
barriers returned to being invisible when moving positions at the end of a lifespan.  (Note that 
barrier reveals did not add time to the lifespan.  So, if a barrier reveal occurred near the end of its 
lifespan, it may only be visible to team members for a short duration.)  
Participants were each seated at a Microsoft Surface 3 tablet running Windows 10, and 
they accessed the COHESION program through an individualized link that was opened in 
Google Chrome (versions 52.0-53.0).  All interactions with the program took place through use 
of an attached, wired computer mouse (Microsoft Basic Optical Mouse v2.0) which was placed 
on a 21.5 by 19.5-cm mousepad.  The COHESION server was hosted on a Dell desktop 
computer running Windows 10, and all computers connected to the server via the university’s 
wireless Internet.   
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Dependent variables.  I evaluated responding on two dependent measures, barrier 
reveals and score.  The COHESION program automatically collected data on both variables and 
saved data for each session in a single comma-separated values delimited text file. 
Barrier reveals.  My primary measure of interest was the frequency with which 
participants revealed barriers (i.e., barrier reveals).  A barrier reveal was scored when 
participants clicked on an unrevealed barrier and held down the mouse until it was made visible 
to their teammates.  Any incomplete attempts to reveal a barrier (e.g., participant stopped holding 
the mouse, barrier changed locations) and interactions with already-revealed barriers were not 
classified as barrier reveals.  Barrier reveal totals were calculated as number of barriers revealed 
per 30-s segment and per 3-min trial.  Because the act of revealing a barrier was hypothesized to 
help teammates avoid barrier collisions, barrier reveals were conceptualized as a measure of 
cooperative responding. 
Score.  To assess the effects of the experimental manipulations on overall performance, I 
also examined net score data.  Net score was calculated as the number of points scored per 3-min 
trial or per 30-s segment minus the number of points lost during the same time frame.  Score was 
conceptualized as a measure of productivity.  
Independent variables and design.  I measured cooperation (i.e., barrier reveals) and 
productivity (i.e., score) as a function of four independent variables: communication, incentive 
type, incentive probability, and price of cooperation.  Effects of communication restriction were 
assessed between the two teams.  I also tested for differential within-team response patterns that 
may have been due to incentive type and incentive probability manipulations.  Finally, 
manipulations in the price of cooperation occurred within all experimental trials. 
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 Communication.  The arrangement for the two teams differed in the degree to which 
team members could communicate with one another.  The first team to participate, referred to as 
the unrestricted team, was assigned to the unrestricted communication condition.  Immediately 
prior to the first trial, the experimenter told them, “You may feel free to talk amongst yourselves 
throughout the session.”  The second team, referred to as the restricted team was assigned to the 
restricted communication condition.  Immediately prior to the first trial, the experimenter told 
them, “You may not talk amongst yourselves while you are playing the game.  In between trials, 
you are free to talk about topics that are not related to the game.”  If participants on the restricted 
team spoke during a trial, or spoke about the game between trials, the experimenter reminded 
participants of the rules stated at the beginning—this prompt was not required at any point in 
Experiment 1. 
Incentive type.  I evaluated the effects of three incentive types: individual, collective, and 
fixed incentives.  Incentive types were arranged in the same manner as those examined by Hursh 
and Roma (2013) and were explained to participants at the beginning of each trial.  In the 
individual incentive condition, participants earned $0.10 per point for their net score on the 
preceding trial.  In the collective incentive condition, a team’s net score for the trial was totaled, 
exchanged for $0.10 per point, and then divided equally amongst the three teammates.  In the 
fixed incentive condition, each team member earned $1.00 for the trial independent of their 
performance—this fixed amount was set to simulate a wage of $20 per hour.  Thus, all 
participants earned the same amount as their teammates during the collective and fixed 
conditions.  
Probability of incentive delivery.  The probability that an incentive would be delivered 
following each trial varied across trials.  I assessed performance under 10% and 100% incentive 
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probabilities.  Incentive probabilities were determined by rolling a 20-sided die, and incentives 
were delivered if the resulting die roll fell within a predetermined range.  That range was 1-2 for 
the 10% condition and 1-20 for the 100% condition—thus, the incentive was always delivered 
during 100% probability trials.   
I assessed whether obtained probabilities of incentive delivery differed from programmed 
probabilities for each team by dividing the number of trials in the 10% condition that a team 
received an incentive by the total number of trials in the 10% incentive condition.  Both teams 
received the incentive on one out of nine trials (11.11%) in the 10% condition.  The trial that the 
restricted team received the incentive for was in the fixed condition, and the unrestricted team 
received the incentive for a trial in the individual condition.  Both teams received the incentive 
on their first exposure to a trial in the 10% condition. 
Both teams were exposed to all combinations of incentive type and probability, a total of 
six incentive conditions delivered across 18 trials.  To determine the order of the incentive 
conditions, I first grouped trials into blocks of three and assigned the 100% and 10% 
probabilities to each block in an alternating fashion, starting with 100%.  I assigned each of the 
three incentive types to one trial per block in a randomized order using a random number 
generator written in Visual Basic for Applications in Microsoft Excel.  Appendix D shows trial 
orders for both teams.   
Price of cooperation.  To assess sensitivity to changes in price of cooperation, I arranged 
the COHESION program to change the time required to reveal a barrier during gameplay.  This 
manipulation occurred within each trial, across six 30-s segments in an ascending fashion in the 
following order (in seconds): 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 3, 4.  Thus, the duration required to reveal a barrier 
increased systematically throughout each trial and reset back to 0.25 s at the beginning of each 
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subsequent trial.  Barrier reveal duration was conceptualized as a price of cooperation from the 
standpoint that the duration required to reveal a barrier was time that could not be spent scoring 
points.   
Procedure.  Upon arrival, an experimenter greeted participants, provided them with an 
informed consent form (Appendix E) and brief demographic questionnaire (Appendix F) to 
complete, and registered them for the ClinCard program.  Participants were then instructed to sit 
at the computer number that corresponded to the order in which they arrived (as shown in 
Appendix B).   
Prior to the first trial, the experimenter gave participants an information sheet (Appendix 
G) with an annotated diagram of the game board and a description of the incentive types and 
probabilities.  Attached to the information sheet was a tracking log that outlined the trial order 
and had a space for participants to record their earnings (Appendix H).  The experimenter 
explained the COHESION gameplay, detailing the point system, how to reveal barriers, and that 
participants would be working together to score points.  Next, the experimenter explained the 
three incentive types and two incentive probabilities.  Description of the game and incentive 
arrangement lasted no more than 5 min.  Participants then had the opportunity to practice in one 
90-s training trial while the experimenter observed each team member to ensure proficiency.  
(Note that, due to a procedural error, the restricted team experienced two 90-s practice trials.)  
Following the practice trial, participants had the opportunity to ask any questions.  Finally, the 
experimenter answered any questions, stated the instruction outlining each team’s level of 
communication restriction, and moved to the start of the first trial.   
All trials were 180 s in duration, with an approximately 90-s intertrial interval.  The 
experimenter stated the incentive type and probability prior to the start of each trial and again 
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immediately after the trial.  During the intertrial interval, the experimenter restated the necessary 
range to receive the incentive, rolled the die, and announced the result.  The experimenter then 
informed each team member of his or her earnings for that trial (if the die roll determined that no 
incentive would be delivered, the experimenter stated that the participants earned $0.00 for that 
trial) and moved to the start of the next trial.   
At the end of the last trial, the experimenter asked the subjects to complete a short debrief 
questionnaire (Appendix I) that asked questions about the clarity of the COHESION gameplay 
instructions, clarity of the incentive instructions, participants’ experience with the COHESION 
gameplay, and whether participants had any sources of outside income.  Finally, the 
experimenter totaled the participants’ earnings and gave each a note indicating how much money 
they earned for the session.  Participants’ earnings were added to their ClinCards within 48 hours 
of their date of participation.    
Data analysis.  I conducted all analyses at the team level, such that the team’s barrier 
reveal total and net score were determined by taking the sum of all three team members’ 
responses.  I analyzed data by (a) comparing response totals across trials and (b) examining 
responding within trials using demand curve analyses.   
 Trial aggregates.  I conducted a series of nonparametric tests to determine whether the 
two primary dependent variables, barrier reveals and score, were differentially affected by 
communication restriction, incentive probability, or incentive type.  I used a Mann-Whitney test 
to examine if there were any differential effects due to the communication manipulation; the 
same test was used to examine responding under the 10% versus 100% probability conditions.  I 
conducted a Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA to test for differential effects across the three 
incentive type conditions and, if significant differences were calculated, a Dunn’s multiple 
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comparison post-test to determine if there were any pairwise differences between the conditions.  
I calculated effect sizes using the Psychometrica online calculator for non-parametric tests 
(Lenhard & Lenhard, 2016), which uses calculations recommended by Fritz, Morris, and Richler 
(2012) and Cohen (2008).  All other statistical tests and model fits were conducted using 
GraphPad Prism® 8.00 (131) for macOS (GraphPad Software, La Jolla, CA, USA, 
www.graphpad.com).  Finally, all analyses for Experiment 1 were two-tailed. 
My decision to use nonparametric tests was due to violations of the assumptions of 
parametric analyses (Siegel, 1956) inherent in the experimental design.  Primarily, the 
experimental design did not support the assumption of independent samples.  Measurements 
were taken as a series of trials within each condition, and as such, each measure is partially 
influenced by the team’s previous experience with the same—as well as different—conditions.  
This serial dependency suggests that repeated measures cannot be considered independent from 
one another (Johnston & Pennypacker, 2009; Jones, Weinrott, & Vaught, 1978).  A second 
reason is that descriptive analyses revealed large differences in variance across samples.  Finally, 
D’Agostino-Pearson normality tests and visual inspection of the data suggested that several 
samples had non-normal distributions of data. 
 Demand curve analyses.  To assess sensitivity to increasing prices of cooperation, I fit 
the teams’ barrier reveal totals at each price of cooperation (i.e., each 30-s segment) to Hursh and 
Silberberg’s (2008) exponential model of demand equation:  
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙 = 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙0 + 𝑘𝑘(𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼(𝑄𝑄0∙𝐶𝐶) − 1)     (1) 
where Q is consumption (barrier reveals) and C is cost (price of cooperation).  Alpha (α) 
represents change in elasticity—or the rate at which consumption is sensitive to increases in 
price—across the range of prices.  Intensity of demand is represented by Q0, which is equal to 
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consumption when the price is free.  Finally, the scaling constant k represents the range of 
consumption in log units.   
 I fit the data to Equation 1 using a freely available GraphPad Prism® template provided 
by the Institutes for Behavior Resources (Exponential Model of Demand template; 
www.ibrinc.org).  For all demand analyses, Q0 and α were left unconstrained and k was set to 
equal log range consumption plus 0.5.  This method of determining the k was chosen to account 
for the potential of levels of consumption higher than those observed (Gilroy, Kaplan, Reed, 
Koffarnus, & Hantula, 2018).  I fit demand curves to data from each combination of 
communication condition, incentive type, and incentive probability (e.g., unrestricted-10%-fixed 
incentive)—a total of 12 curves.  The log range of consumption in Experiment 1 was 2.0, so k 
was set at 2.5 for all analyses. 
 I derived the additional demand metrics, Pmax and essential value (EV), from Equation 1 
using a freely available Microsoft Excel-based calculator developed by Kaplan and Reed (2014) 
that uses equations for each metric presented by Hursh (2014).  Pmax indicates the price at which 




 , where 𝑚𝑚 = 0.083𝑘𝑘 + .65.    (2) 
Essential value, like α, reflects sensitivity to changes in price and is calculated with Equation 3: 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 1
100∙𝛼𝛼∙𝑘𝑘1.5
 .       (3) 
 I conducted a series of Extra sum-of-squares F tests to determine if one curve adequately 
fit multiple data sets.  I compared values across the three incentive types for all four 
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combinations of communication and probability conditions (i.e., restricted-10%, restricted-
100%, unrestricted-10%, and unrestricted-100%). 
Results and Discussion 
 Demographic and debrief data.  Demographic characteristics for participants in 
Experiment 1 are depicted in Table 1.  Participants’ ages ranged from 18-20 years (M = 19).  
Team compositions with respect to demographic characteristics are detailed in Table 2 along 
with participants’ incentive earnings for the session.   
 Results from the debrief questionnaire indicated that all participants found the 
COHESION instructions to be moderately clear or very clear.  Similarly, all participants found 
instructions about how incentives were to be delivered to be moderately clear or very clear.  All 
six participants indicated that they have outside sources of income: five indicated that they have 
a job (all of whom also have loans or receive financial assistance from parents or guardians) and 
the sixth also received student loans.    
Group aggregates.  Tables 3-5 depict aggregate trial totals for barrier reveals and score 
when separated out across team, probability of incentive delivery, and incentive type.   
Communication.  Trial totals for barrier reveals and score separated out between the 
restricted and unrestricted teams are depicted in Figure 2.  A Mann-Whitney test indicated there 
was a significant difference in barrier reveals (MdnUnrestricted = 77.5, 95% CI [74, 87]; MdnRestricted 
= 10.5, 95% CI [5, 38]) between the two teams, U = 10, p < .001, d = 2.68, with the unrestricted 
team (Mdn = 113.5, 95% CI [104, 124]) also scoring significantly more points than the restricted 
team (Mdn = 84, 95% CI [71, 93]), U = 32, p < .001, d = 1.88.   
Probability of incentive delivery.  Given the large differences in responding between the 
two teams, I evaluated effects of probability of incentive delivery for each team separately.  
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Figure 3 and Table 4 depict trial totals for barrier reveals and score between probability of 
incentive delivery conditions for both teams.  Mann-Whitney tests indicated no statistically 
significant difference in barrier reveals between probabilities for the restricted, U = 19.5, p = 
.066, d = 0.97, or unrestricted teams, U = 36, p = .715, d = 0.19.  There was also no indication of 
a difference in score between probability conditions for the restricted, U = 19.5, p = .065, d = 
0.97, or unrestricted teams, U = 37.5, p = .812, d = 0.13.  
Incentive type.  As I did with evaluations of probability of incentive delivery, I evaluated 
effects of incentive type for each team separately.  Each team’s trial totals for barrier reveals and 
score separated out by incentive type are depicted in Figure 4 and Table 5.  Kruskal-Wallis one-
way ANOVAs showed that there was no significant difference in barrier reveals for the 
restricted, H(2) = 1.5, p = .489, η2 = 0.033, and unrestricted teams, H(2) = 1.96, p = .394, η2 = 
0.107.  Likewise, Kruskal-Wallis tests found no significant difference in scores between the 
incentive types for the restricted, H(2) = 1.67, p = .453, η2 = .103, and unrestricted teams, H(2) = 
1.25, p = .558, η2 = .096.  Follow-up Dunn’s multiple-comparisons tests were not conducted 
given that the ANOVAs did not reveal significant differences.   
Price of cooperation.  Mean barrier reveal rates across the range of prices of cooperation 
separated out by team and probability of incentive delivery are depicted in Figures 5-7.  Demand 
parameters and indices for each curve are listed in Table 6.  Overall, these data indicate 
systematic decreases in barrier reveal rates as a function of increasing price of cooperation for all 
analyses; however, given the limited number of exposures to each condition combination, there 
are some exceptions.  For example, in the individual-10% condition, the restricted team revealed 
more barriers when the price of cooperation was 2 s (M = 3.33 reveals) than at the 0.5 and 1 s 
prices of cooperation (Ms = 2.67 and 2.33 reveals, respectively).  The restricted team’s 
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responding in the fixed-10% condition is also worth noting as the mean barrier reveal rates at 
three prices (0.25, 3, and 4 s) was 0.  Because the exponential demand equation requires 
logarithmic transformation of data (and the logarithm of 0 is undefined), these values were not 
analyzed2.  Given the limited data available to generate each curve, I restricted the scope of these 
analyses to examination of broad patterns across conditions, rather than close inspection of 
individual parameters and demand metrics.  
Figure 5 depicts the restricted team’s data for each incentive type separated across the 
10% (top panel) and 100% (bottom panel) probability of incentive conditions.  As mentioned 
above, the limited number of exposures at each price of cooperation produced somewhat 
unsystematic visual response patterns in the 10% probability conditions and relatively poor fits 
to the exponential demand equation (R2s = .83, .04, and .61 for collective, individual, and fixed 
conditions, respectively).  An Extra sum-of-squares F test confirmed that there was a significant 
difference between the curves, F(4,9) = 13, p < .001.   
Data for the restricted team appeared to be more systematic in the 100% probability 
conditions and provided better fits to the exponential demand equation (R2s = .92, .91, and .84 
for collective, fixed, and individual conditions, respectively) than the 10% conditions.  
Responding was most elastic under the collective condition (α = .011) and least elastic under the 
individual condition (α = .005), indicating that responding was most sensitive to increases in 
price of cooperation under the collective condition.  An Extra sum-of-squares F test indicated 
that a single curve does not fit the data from all three incentive types, F(4,12) = 5.1, p = .013.   
                                                 
2 A total of 5 zero-values were not analyzed.  The remaining two were under the unrestricted-
100%-collective and unrestricted-10%-individual conditions at the 4-s price of cooperation.  
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Demand curves for the unrestricted team are depicted in Figure 6 and are separated by 
incentive type between the 10% (top panel) and 100% (bottom panel) conditions.  Extra sum-of-
squares F tests indicated that one curve adequately fit the data from all three incentive types for 
the 10% probability condition, F(4,11) = 0.07, p = .991, and, separately, the 100% probability 
condition, F(4,11) = 1.4, p = .291.  As such, these data are depicted by the single shared curve 
that best fits all data under each probability condition.  I conducted an additional test to examine 
if all the unrestricted team’s data could be adequately fit with a single curve.  Results indicated 
that a single curve adequately fit all of the unrestricted team’s data across all incentive types and 
probabilities, F(10,22) = 0.81, p = .624.  The shared aggregate curve is shown in Figure 7 and 
demand parameters and metrics are outlined in Table 6.   
To summarize findings from Experiment 1, I observed large differences in aggregate 
barrier reveals and score attributable to the communication manipulation.  The unrestricted team 
engaged in more cooperative responses and scored more points than the restricted team.  
However, patterns of differentiated responding were not present when evaluating incentive 
delivery manipulations.  I observed no significant differences attributable to either probability of 
incentive delivery or incentive type.   
Demand curve analyses of within-session cooperative responding demonstrated 
systematic decreases in responding as a function of increasing price of cooperation.  Closer 
examination of responding across each of the independent variables revealed two different 
response patterns between the two teams.  The unrestricted team’s cooperative responses across 
all conditions were accounted for by a single demand curve.  That is, there were no significant 
differences in intensity or elasticity of demand between any of the incentive probabilities or 
types.  In contrast to the unrestricted team’s uniform responding, the restricted team’s 
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cooperative responses varied greatly across incentive conditions.  For example, at low prices, 
they revealed the fewest barriers under the individual condition, but when prices increased, they 
revealed the most barriers in the individual conditions.  Thus, analyses of responding across a 
range of prices revealed differences between incentive type conditions that were not detected at 
the aggregate level. 
Taken together, the findings from Experiment 1 demonstrated the utility of a 
methodological framework involving COHESION to assess the effects of different independent 
variables.  However, given that the nature of Experiment 1 was as an initial investigation, the 
generality of findings is limited for several reasons.  With respect to the communication 
manipulation, no data were collected on the teams’ verbal behaviors during sessions to provide 
validity to the different levels of the independent variable—anecdotally, the restricted team did 
not communicate with one another and the unrestricted team communicated continuously 
throughout the session.  In addition, only one team participated in each condition, so the 
observed effects may have been idiosyncratic.  Analyses of incentive type and probability 
outcomes are also limited due to the low frequency of exposures to each incentive condition.  
Because there were few trials under each incentive type and probability combination, it was 
difficult to isolate effects on any single controlling variable.  Thus, the focus of Experiment 2 
was to lend generality to these findings by focusing on fewer experimental conditions with more 
teams.      
Experiment 2 
Method 
 In Experiment 2, I addressed the limitations identified in Experiment 1 and extended the 
generality of its findings.  I used a similar arrangement as in Experiment 1 but removed the 
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collective incentive condition and the probability of incentive delivery independent variable.  
These manipulations allowed for twice as many exposures to each incentive type as were 
possible in Experiment 1.  Thus, my research question focused on the effects of fixed versus 
individual incentives on cooperation and productivity amongst restricted versus unrestricted 
communication teams.  I also increased the number of teams in each condition to account for 
potentially idiosyncratic effects between communication conditions.   
Participants and setting.  The participants for Experiment 2 were 24 undergraduate 
students (3 males and 21 females) recruited in the same manner as in Experiment 1.  Participants 
were assigned to teams in the order in which they signed up for the experiment, with three 
participants in each team.  Participants were compensated in the same manner as Experiment 1.   
Data collection for each team occurred within a single 90-min visit, and teams 
participated within a time frame of 47 weeks.  All sessions took place in the same room, with the 
same arrangement, as Experiment 1.  
COHESION program, gameplay, and apparatus.  The materials were the same as in 
Experiment 1 with the following exceptions.  First, the program was run on Google Chrome 
(versions 54.0-61.0).  Second, for the first four teams to participate, the COHESION server was 
run on a Dell desktop computer running Windows 10 and all computers were connected through 
the university’s wireless internet (the same setup as in Experiment 1).  Whereas, for the last four 
teams to participate, the COHESION server was run on a MacBook Pro running macOS version 
10.12 and all computers were connected through an Ethernet-connected local area network.  
These changes to the apparatus were made to improve the stability of the program (previously 
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any disruption in connection would effectively terminate the session in progress3).  To my 
knowledge, there were no differential effects to gameplay as a result of these changes.  
Dependent variables.  The primary dependent variables were barrier reveals and score 
and they were measured in the same manner as with Experiment 1.   
Independent variables and design.  I measured cooperation (i.e., barrier reveals) and 
productivity (i.e., score) as a function of three independent variables: communication restriction, 
incentive type, and price of cooperation.  As in Experiment 1, communication restriction was 
assessed between groups, incentive type was assessed within group, and price of cooperation was 
assessed within each trial.  
Communication.  Communication restriction was arranged using the same conditions as 
in Experiment 1.  The first four teams to participate were assigned to the restricted 
communication conditions and will be referred to as R1, R2, R3, and R4.  The final four teams to 
participate were assigned to the unrestricted communication condition and will be referred to as 
UR1, UR2, UR3, and UR4.  The experimenter used the same instructions and procedure to 
implement the conditions as in Experiment 1. 
Incentive type.  I evaluated effects of the fixed and individual incentive conditions, which 
were arranged in the same manner as in Experiment 1.   
Price of cooperation.  Barrier reveal durations were arranged in the same manner as with 
Experiment 1. 
Procedure.  As with Experiment 1, participants had the opportunity to earn an incentive 
following each 180-s trial.  Incentive type for each trial alternated in a quasi-random order such 
                                                 
3 Participants for whom connectivity issues occurred were dropped from the experiment. All data 
reported are from participants’ first experience with the COHESION program.   
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that no incentive type was presented more than two consecutive times and the difference between 
frequency of presentations for each incentive was no greater than one.  Trial orders were 
randomized using the same random number generator as in Experiment 1 and are listed in 
Appendix J.   
 The same procedures as Experiment 1 were used for participant orientation and 
instructions.  The experimenter restated incentive type and informed each team member of his or 
her earnings during the intertrial interval, which took approximately 90 s.  As with Experiment 1, 
the experimenter totaled participants earnings at the end of the last trial, gave each participant a 
note indicating how much they earned for the session, and added money to the ClinCards within 
48 hours.  Participants did not complete a debrief questionnaire for Experiment 2.  
Data analysis.  As in Experiment 1, I conducted all analyses at the team level and 
evaluated responding across and within trials.  All analyses were the same as with Experiment 1 
with the following exceptions.  First, because there were only two incentive type conditions 
(individual and fixed), I used a Mann-Whitney instead of a Kruskal-Wallis to measure its effects.  
Second, I conducted demand curve analyses to assess differences between communication 
conditions, between incentive conditions, and between each of the four combinations of 
communication and incentive conditions.  Likewise, I conducted a series of Extra sum-of-squares 
F tests to determine if one curve adequately fit all the data sets across communication conditions, 
incentive conditions, and the combined communication and incentive conditions.  The scaling 
parameter, k, was 1.4 for the communication curves (log range: 0.9), 1.9 for the incentive type 




Procedural integrity.  Data on the experimenter’s implementation of the experimental 
procedures were recorded by a research assistant who was also present in the room during 
sessions.  Using the data sheet shown in Appendix K the research assistant observed whether the 
experimenter stated the correct incentive condition prior to the start of each trial and again at the 
end of the trial, along with each participant’s incentive amount.  A correct response for incentive 
condition type involved stating the incentive condition (i.e., fixed or individual).  Correct 
responses for announcing the incentive amount involved telling each participant how much they 
earned on the previous trial.  During fixed incentive conditions, a statement to the group as a 
whole (e.g., “you all earned $1.00 for this trial”) was also considered a correct response.  
Procedural integrity data were collected during part or all of seven of the eight teams’ sessions 
for a total of 82.3% of all trials conducted (79 out of 96 trials); procedural integrity was 100% 
for all trials recorded.   
 Intragroup communication and interobserver agreement.  To measure the degree to 
which participants adhered to the communication manipulation as it was designed, the 
experimenter also collected data on intrateam communication.  Data were recorded on whether 
participants engaged in any communication during or between trials.  Communication was 
defined as any vocal verbal form of communication that included at least a single recognizable 
word.  Thus, utterances (e.g., “oohhh,” “ugh,” “eghhh”), hand or body movements (e.g., nodding 
head, fist pumps), or other non-vocal verbal behaviors (e.g., banging the mouse on the table) 
were not scored.  To assist in developing a more precise definition to be used on future research 
projects, we also attempted to classify communication as off-topic or relevant to the game; 
however, I did not make this distinction when evaluating data for the present study.   
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 The research assistant recording procedural integrity data also recorded data for the 
purposes of calculating interobserver agreement (IOA) data using the same data sheet as shown 
in Appendix K.  To calculate IOA, I used an interval-by-interval IOA procedure as described by 
Cooper, Heron, and Heward (2007).  Specifically, I divided the number of intervals with an 
agreement by the total number of intervals for which secondary data were recorded and 
multiplied the result by 100 for each session.  Agreements were defined as both data recorders 
indicating that a form of communication occurred or did not occur for the same interval.  Mean 
IOA across all trials was 97% (range: 87.5-100%).   
Results and Discussion 
Demographic data.  Demographic characteristics for participants in Experiment 2 are 
depicted in Table 7.  Participants’ ages ranged from 18-22 years (M = 19).  Table 8 provides 
details of team compositions and participants’ total incentives earned during the session.   
Intrateam communication.  Intrateam communication data are depicted in Table 9.  
Teams in the restricted condition rarely communicated, and there were only two occasions when 
communication occurred during a trial (both of those instances were brief).  Two of the teams in 
the unrestricted condition engaged in a single occurrence of communication.  Communication 
occurred during gameplay for only one team in the unrestricted condition, UR3.    
Group aggregates.  Table 10 depicts aggregate trial totals for barrier reveals and score 
across communication and incentive type.  Barrier reveal and score totals for each team are 
shown in Figure 8.  
Communication.  Trial totals for barrier reveals and score across the communication 
conditions are depicted in Figure 9.  Teams in the restricted condition (Mdn = 14, 95% CI [9, 
19]) revealed a similar number of barriers as those in the unrestricted condition (Mdn = 18, 95% 
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CI [7, 33]).  Likewise, trial totals for score were similar for the restricted (Mdn = 68, 95% CI [63, 
80]) and unrestricted (Mdn = 74, 95% CI [66, 81]) conditions.  Mann-Whitney tests showed that 
there were no differences between the incentive types with respect to barrier reveals, U = 1116, p 
= .794, d = 0.05, or score, U = 1103, p = .719, d = 0.07.   
 Incentive type.  Figure 10 shows trial totals for barrier reveals and score collapsed across 
communication conditions and separated by incentive type.  Teams revealed more than twice as 
many barriers under a fixed incentive (Mdn = 23.5, 95% CI [12, 42]) than under an individual 
incentive (Mdn = 10.5, 95% CI [5, 17]).  However, teams scored more points under an individual 
incentive (Mdn = 75.5, 95% CI [68, 87]) than under the fixed incentive (Mdn = 66.5, 95% CI 
[54, 74]).  Mann-Whitney tests indicated statistically significant differences for barrier reveals, U 
= 759, p = .004, d = 0.62, and score, U = 857.5, p = .031, d = 0.45.  
Price of cooperation.  Figure 11 depicts mean barrier reveals across the range of prices 
of cooperation when separated by communication condition and incentive type separately.  
Figure 12 depicts barrier reveals when separated by each possible combination of 
communication and incentive condition.  Demand curves fit to the data demonstrate systematic 
decreases in barrier reveals as a function of increasing price of cooperation for all analyses.  
Demand parameters and indices for each curve are shown in Table 11.   
Communication.  The top panel of Figure 11 depicts barrier reveals when separated by 
communication condition.  Intensity (Q0) and elasticity (α) were similar for both conditions, but 
the Extra sum-of-squares F test indicated that a single curve did not sufficiently fit both curves 
for the restricted and unrestricted data, F(2,8) = 6.5, p = .021.  
Incentive type.  The bottom panel of Figure 11 depicts barrier reveals when collapsed 
across communication condition and separated by incentive type.  Overall, teams revealed fewer 
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barriers at all prices and were more sensitive to increases in price under the individual condition.  
An Extra sum-of-squares F test confirmed that the data sets were better fit by separate curves, 
F(2,8) = 245, p < .001.   
Communication x Incentive type.  Demand curves for barrier reveals separated by 
communication and incentive condition combinations are depicted in Figure 12.  Visual 
inspection of the curves suggests similar results for the combined conditions as when effects of 
each variable was observed separately.  Specifically, the fixed-restricted and fixed-unrestricted 
curves were similar to one another, but with greater intensity and less elasticity than the 
individual-restricted and individual-unrestricted curves.  An Extra sum-of-squares F test 
indicated that one curve does not adequately fit all four data sets, F(6,16) = 53, p <.001.  
Subsequent pairwise Extra sum-of-squares F tests indicated that no single curve adequately fit 
any two of the four conditions, with the exception of the comparison of the individual-restricted 
and individual-unrestricted conditions, F(2,8) = 0.33, p = .728 (all other Fs(2,8) > 47, ps < .001). 
The shared curve combining the two individual restricted and individual unrestricted conditions 
is depicted in Figure 13.   
Aggregate responding in the communication and incentive manipulations is summarized 
in Table 10.  I observed no difference in responding between teams in the restricted and 
unrestricted communication conditions.  With respect to the comparison of incentive type, teams 
revealed more barriers under the fixed incentive but scored more points under the individual 
incentive.  That is, the teams were more cooperative, but less productive when pay was delivered 
noncontingently.   
 Within-session analyses of barrier reveals indicated that cooperative responses were 
sensitive to increases in price.  Demand curve analyses supported findings from aggregate 
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analyses of the differential effects of incentive type on responding.  Further, the demand analyses 
indicated that teams working under the fixed condition had a higher intensity and lower elasticity 
of demand than under the individual condition.  As with the aggregate-level comparison, within-
session analyses revealed similar levels of responding across the communication conditions.  
However, demand curve analyses revealed significant differences in elasticity, with restricted 
teams more sensitive to increases in price than unrestricted teams.  Finally, demand curve 
analyses of responses separated by communication and incentive condition combinations 
indicated that there was not a significant difference between restricted and unrestricted teams 
working under the individual incentive condition.  Thus, the differential responding between 
restricted and unrestricted conditions can be explained by the difference observed under the fixed 
incentive condition.   
 One important limitation to note is that only two of the four teams in the unrestricted 
condition engaged in any form of communication.  Although the experimental manipulation 
involved assessment of restricted versus unrestricted communication contexts, a lack 
communication within a team may have a similar functional effect on responding as the 
restricted communication arrangement. 
General Discussion 
The purpose of the present experiments was to evaluate a methodology that uses a 
behavioral economic framework to assess relations between incentives and social behaviors in a 
team-based work task.  Additionally, to assess the utility of the COHESION program for use in 
evaluations of workplace performance, I examined effects of manipulations to antecedent and 
consequent variables that commonly affect employee behavior.  The antecedent variable of 
interest, communication, produced varied results between the two experiments.  In Experiment 1, 
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the unrestricted team, who could talk amongst themselves, engaged in more cooperative and 
productive behaviors than the restricted team; whereas, I observed no difference between 
communication conditions in Experiment 2.  I also observed varied results with the consequent 
variables, incentive type and probability, between experiments.  There was little indication of 
effects of incentive manipulations in Experiment 1, but results indicated a significant difference 
between incentive conditions in Experiment 2. 
I conducted a parametric analysis of constraints on cooperation by increasing barrier 
reveal duration within each trial.  By plotting barrier reveal data across the six prices of 
cooperation and using demand analyses to fit curves to the data, I measured sensitivity to 
increases in price of cooperation across conditions.  Across both experiments, I observed 
systematic decreases in cooperation as a function of increasing price, and general findings were 
consistent with those from trial-level analyses summarized previously.  Demand curve analyses 
also indicated whether differential levels of responding observed at the trial level were consistent 
throughout the range of prices or were only apparent at higher prices of cooperation.  
Findings from the present experiments are consistent with the varied literatures that 
informed my methodological approach.  The unrestricted and restricted communication 
conditions were analogs to the social and nonsocial arrangements that Hake and Vukelich (1972) 
described as characteristic of cooperative behavior research.  Although both conditions in the 
present experiments would likely be classified as social by Hake and Vukelich’s definitions, they 
were arranged to be representative of different workplace contexts.  For example, the 
unrestricted condition may resemble a modern open workplace, and a traditional office with 
individual cubicles may serve as a parallel to the restricted condition.  The inconsistent findings 
across experiments may be due to different levels of intrateam communication.  Whereas the 
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unrestricted team in Experiment 1 communicated throughout the session, communication 
amongst unrestricted teams was minimal in Experiment 2.  The present findings then are 
consistent with previous research suggesting that teams cooperate more when conditions are 
more social (e.g., Burnstein & Wolff, 1964), but that intrateam communication may be an 
important component responsible for increased cooperation (e.g., Hake & Vukelich, 1973).   
I included different probabilities of incentive delivery as a consequent manipulation to 
assess the effects of reinforcement schedules on cooperation (i.e., barrier reveals) and 
productivity (i.e., score).  Results are consistent with laboratory research suggesting that 
performance may be maintained on relatively low-probability random-ratio schedules of 
reinforcement (Catania, 2013).  Although probabilities of incentive delivery for the 10% 
condition were obtained exactly as programmed (one out of nine trials for both teams), a 
potential confound is that both teams received the incentive on their first trial in the condition.  
Thus, the percentage of trials in the 10% condition for which they received an incentive started at 
100% and may have maintained performance throughout the remainder of the experiment.   
Although compensation is rarely based completely on performance, I evaluated the 
collective, fixed, and individual incentive types as analogs to naturalistic pay systems.  I did not 
detect any difference between conditions in Experiment 1; however, removal of the probability 
manipulation and collective incentive condition allowed for more focused analyses.  The finding 
in Experiment 2 that teams scored more points under individual incentive conditions than fixed 
conditions is consistent with previous research demonstrating that incentives delivered 
contingently maintain higher levels of performance than noncontingent incentives.   
From an organizational perspective, increases in the price of cooperation may be 
considered analogous to greater work requirements associated with various job duties.  For 
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example, a cooperative task with a low price may involve picking up supplies from a storage 
room, whereas a high-priced task could entail training a coworker on a new protocol.  Findings 
from the present study are consistent with Hake and Vukelich’s (1973) findings that cooperation 
decreases as response effort increases.  The importance of parametric analyses within the context 
of social behavior is highlighted when comparing across- versus within-trial data from the 
present experiments.  For example, in Experiment 2, I did not detect a significant difference in 
cooperation across communication conditions in the trial-level analyses (Table 10, top panel of 
Figure 9).  Likewise, visual inspection of within-trial responding (top panel of Figure 11) also 
indicated no difference in barrier reveals at low prices.  However, at high prices of cooperation, 
differentiated levels of responding became apparent, demonstrating that responding at one price 
may not be representative of responding across a range of values.   
Contributions to the Literature 
There are several ways in which the present experiments provide contributions to the 
literature.  First, the methods used provide a contemporary methodology for conducting social 
behavior research.  Importantly, the current experiments build on existing literature as the 
methodology is consistent with the dimensions of previous cooperation research outlined by 
Hake and Vukelich (1972).  The COHESION program addresses some limitations of previous 
human operant approaches as its versatility allows for parametric analyses of multiple behaviors 
and varying team sizes while maintaining an unstructured, free-operant context.  Although some 
recent behavior analytic studies have evaluated human social behavior (e.g., Alavos, Iñesta, 
Ortiz, Villa, & Miranda, 2018; de Toledo et al., 2015; Jimenez & Pietras, 2018; Krockow, 
Colman, & Pulford, 2018; Vasconcelos & Todorov, 2015), there is limited discussion on the 
applicability of the research in recent literature.  Thus, a related contribution of the present 
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experiments is a demonstration of an area—OBM—that could benefit from social behavior 
research.   
A second contribution of the present findings is the relation identified between incentives 
and social behavior.  Taken together, trial-level and demand curve analyses indicated a clear 
functional relation between cooperation and incentive arrangement.  This finding is noteworthy 
as it lends support to previous suggestions that incentives may affect social interactions within a 
team (e.g., Honeywell-Johnson & Dickinson, 1999) and may have important implications for 
OBM practitioners.  For example, employers might consider how delivering incentives 
contingent on productivity alone may decrease cooperative responses and ultimately affect an 
organization’s overall productivity.  Thus, when arranging performance-based incentives, it may 
be important for desirable social behaviors to be included on performance evaluations.  Further, 
workplaces with low levels of cooperation may experience increased burnout and turnover 
(Ganster et al., 2011; Hantula, 2015), leading to increased costs with personnel selection and 
training.  With these considerations, future research might also evaluate the effects of incentive 
type on other social behaviors and interactions, such as competition and communication.   
Third, the present findings add to a line of recent research examining applications of 
behavioral economics to OBM (e.g., Henley, DiGennaro Reed, Reed, et al., 2016; Hirst & 
DiGennaro Reed, 2016; Wine et al., 2012).  In the present experiments, application of a 
behavioral economic framework allowed for detailed interpretation of the parametric analysis of 
responding across multiple prices of cooperation.  Ultimately, this analysis led to the 
identification of differences between conditions that were not apparent in trial-level data.  
Further, using demand curves, researchers can make predictions of responding at untested prices, 
and derived metrics allow for comparisons across experiments.  
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Fourth, the present experiments extend the overall utility of demand curve analyses.  In 
both experiments, I observed systematic decreases in cooperative behavior as a function of 
increases in the price of cooperation.  These response patterns are consistent with a large body of 
research using demand curve analyses across multiple domains (Reed, Kaplan, & Becirevic, 
2015).  To my knowledge, few published studies have directly evaluated behavioral economic 
demand for nontangible or nonconsumable commodities in humans.  Thus, the approach used in 
the present study contributes to behavioral economic literature by extending demand curve 
methodology to the analysis of a novel form of commodity.  
One observation that may warrant additional research and further discussion is that there 
is no apparent or universal functional reinforcer of cooperative effort.  That is, in the present 
experiments, I observed patterns of cooperative responding consistent with robust findings from 
previous research; however, unlike much of the extant literature, there is no clear delivery of a 
reinforcer in the present arrangement.  In addition to sensitivity to price, I observed differentiated 
levels of responding across some but not all manipulations in the present experiments, which 
suggests that cooperation is not maintained automatically, but rather is sensitive to 
environmental variables.  There are myriad potential controlling variables, and in-depth 
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, but potential explanations may involve 
reinforcement through reciprocal exchange (e.g., Hake et al., 1975), histories of reinforcement 
for cooperation, or avoidance of potential aversive consequences for not cooperating.  Thus, 
future research conducting functional analyses to identify variables maintaining cooperative 
effort may be beneficial as a parsimonious explanation may expand the generality of demand 
curve methodology.  
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 The final major contribution involves the translational research approach to OBM.  There 
are many challenges associated with conducting experimental evaluations in naturalistic work 
settings.  For example, an OBM researcher interested in evaluating the effects of incentives may 
encounter ethical concerns associated with incentive arrangements that create unnecessary 
employee stress (e.g., Ganster et al., 2011) or opposition from labor unions, which have 
historically opposed compensation systems deemed to provide unfair benefits across employees 
(e.g., American Federation of Teachers, 2003).  Likewise, when considering social behaviors, the 
varied nature of everyday work tasks makes it difficult to assess a single dimension of a 
constraint on social behaviors in natural settings.  Thus, OBM researchers must identify practical 
methods to assess these complex human behaviors.   
The human operant laboratory provides OBM researchers with a highly controlled setting 
where they can model organizational contexts and evaluate specific effects of behavioral 
principles on workplace performance (Hake, 1982; Mace & Critchfield, 2010).  This use-inspired 
basic research (Stokes, 1997) provides vital insights on how basic behavioral principles directly 
affect workplace performance—an area with relatively limited research to date (DiGennaro 
Reed, Henley, Hirst, Doucette, & Jenkins, 2015; Poling et al., 2000).  Related to the present 
experiments, researchers may use these methods to further compare incentive arrangements 
using demand curve analyses.  Derived measures, such as EV, indicate under which incentive 
arrangements social behaviors may be more sensitive to increasing constraints and allows for 
comparison of sensitivity across conditions and across studies.  Practitioners working in 
organizational settings may then use that information to arrange incentives in a manner that best 
promotes desired performance.   
Limitations and Future Research 
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 Interpretation of findings from the present experiments should be tempered as there are 
several limitations and areas that may call for future research.  The experimental framework was 
designed with the assumption that COHESION serves as an analog to naturalistic work settings.  
Within this framework, I arranged the independent variables to model various factors that affect 
workplace performance.  However, by design, the nature of the task is abstract and, thus, may 
not serve as an appropriate simulation of naturalistic work.  Research extending this 
methodology may need to examine responding on tasks that better simulate workplace behaviors 
before findings can be appropriately translated into practice.  
 Another limitation is that, due to the translational nature of the experiment and novelty of 
the task, I arranged incentive types at the extreme ends of a continuum ranging from fixed to 
individual.  However, arrangements where pay is completely tied to performance are rare and not 
representative of naturalistic settings.  Future research in this area might involve evaluation of 
incentive systems commonly used in practice.  Researchers might also examine responding 
under systems where incentives are delivered based on an individual’s performance relative to 
the rest of the team or to only the top performer in each team.  Under this type of system, 
cooperative responses may—in addition to the time required—also cost participants an 
opportunity at receiving an incentive, and the added constraint would likely decrease demand.    
Another potential confound is the effect that variations in team composition may have on 
team-level responding.  Demographic characteristics of participants in the present experiments 
were mostly homogenous across teams; however, I did not assess the degree to which 
participants knew one another.  Previous interactions within teams, and related variables, likely 
affect cooperation, productivity, and intrateam communication.  Future research might evaluate 
if there are any differential effects due to social familiarity and histories.  Identification of such 
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effects may be beneficial in identifying key areas for interventions aimed at increasing 
cooperation.  However, it is also important to note that, in practice, employees have long 
histories of social interactions with one another which may be difficult to overcome.  Thus, 
future research may also focus on identifying contexts and contingencies that promote desired 
responding in an efficient manner regardless of group composition.   
 Another area where findings from the aggregate analyses are limited is with respect to 
statistical power.  Because trial-level data analysis involved examination of multiple trials from 
each team as individual data points, I believed it was more appropriate to use nonparametric tests 
to analyze aggregate data.  However, devoid of a two-factor nonparametric test, I analyzed the 
data for each condition individually.  This method decreased sample size and is unable to detect 
main or interaction effects.  In addition, I did not conduct a power analysis prior to conducting 
the study.  However, I conducted post-hoc power analyses based on observed effect size using 
G*Power 3.1.9.2 for macOS (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007), which identified that 
there was sufficient power at the recommended .80 level (Cohen, 1988) for three of the four 
aggregate-level comparisons that indicated significant differences between groups.  Insufficient 
power was demonstrated in the Experiment 2 comparison of score between incentive conditions, 
1-β = .57.  Future research may address these constraints by increasing the number of teams 
participating, identifying and using methodology that allows for use of more appropriate or 
advanced statistical tests, or using single case research methodology.  (Note that demand curve 
analyses may be considered a form of single case research design, and as such future studies may 
focus on demand analyses as the primary method of analysis.)  
A final limitation concerns the parameters involved in arranging the COHESION 
program.  Although I used the same arrangement in both experiments, the program allows for 
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modification of several variables, such as number of participants, barrier lifespan, and number of 
barriers per participant.  Altering these parameters would likely change the gameplay experience 
and may lead to differential outcomes.  Future research may focus on identifying how 
modifications to gameplay affect performance under various conditions.  Importantly, a stronger 
understanding of how parameters affect gameplay may help in simulating various workplace 
contexts.  For example, researchers could use the game to model cooperative behavior in settings 
where employees typically work independently (e.g., real estate) versus those where cooperation 
may be necessary for success (e.g., hospitals).   
 In sum, for the present experiments, I brought together research from multiple domains—
performance management, social behavior, and behavioral economics—to evaluate contexts and 
contingencies that commonly affect workplace performance.  Findings, although somewhat 
preliminary, are consistent with literature from the various areas of research that informed the 
conceptualization of these experiments.  This synthesis of research across domains extends the 
generality of previous findings and further verifies the analytic approaches of each discipline 
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Experiment 1 Participant Demographic Characteristics  
Demographic n 









Black/African American 0 
Hispanic/Latino 2 
Asian 1 













Experiment 1 Team Composition  
Team Participant Age Gender Earnings 
Restricted 
1 18 Female $17.56 
2 20 Female $21.06 
3 19 Female $22.96 
Unrestricted 
1 19 Female $25.88 
2 19 Female $29.18 
3 19 Female $27.18 






Experiment 1 Group Aggregates by Communication Condition 
Condition n Mdn 95% CIa Normal Dist.b U p d 
 Barrier Reveals 
Communication     10 < .001 2.68 
Restricted 18 10.5 [5, 38] Yes    
Unrestricted 18 77.5 [74, 87] Yes    
 Score 
Communication     32 < .001 1.88 
Restricted 18 84.0 [71, 93] Yes    
Unrestricted 18 113.5 [104, 124] Yes    
a95% confidence interval of the median.  bD’Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test (α = .05).  
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Table 4  
Experiment 1 Group Aggregates by Communication and Probability Condition 
Condition n Mdn 95% CIa Normal Dist.b U p d 
 Barrier Reveals 
Restricted     19.5 .066 0.97 
10% 9 5 [1, 41] Yes    
100% 9 28 [8, 64] Yes    
Unrestricted     36 .715 0.19 
10% 9 76 [58, 88] Yes    
100% 9 79 [73, 90] Yes    
 Score 
Restricted     19.5 .065 0.97 
10% 9 88 [79, 107] Yes    
100% 9 72 [61, 91] Yes    
Unrestricted     37.5 .812 0.13 
10% 9 114 [104, 124] Yes    
100% 9 113 [89, 138] Yes    





Experiment 1 Group Aggregates by Communication and Incentive Type Condition 
Condition n Mdn 95% CIa Normal Dist.b H(2) p η2 
 Barrier Reveals 
Restricted     1.5 .489 0.033 
Collective 6 22 [5, 53] Yes    
Fixed 6 6 [0, 64] Yes    
Individual 6 8 [5, 75] Yes    
Unrestricted     1.96 .394 0.107 
Collective 6 77 [73, 84] Yes    
Fixed 6 77 [58, 92] Yes    
Individual 6 75 [54, 90] Yes    
 Score 
Restricted     1.67 .453 0.103 
Collective 6 97 [61, 107] Yes    
Fixed 6 79 [67, 90] No    
Individual 6 84 [56, 113] No    
Unrestricted     1.25 .558 0.096 
Collective 6 99 [97, 154] Yes    
Fixed 6 109 [79, 125] Yes    
Individual 6 113 [89, 126] Yes    






Experiment 1 Demand Parameters and Metrics 
Curve k R2 Q0 α EV Pmax Omax 
Restricted        
10%        
Collective 2.5 .83 11.0 .0160 0.158 1.23 4.41 
Fixed 2.5 .04 0.5 .0360 0.070 12.82 1.96 
Individual 2.5 .61 4.4 .0120 0.211 4.11 5.88 
100%        
Collective 2.5 .92 8.4 .0110 0.230 2.35 6.42 
Fixed 2.5 .91 12.0 .0086 0.294 2.10 8.21 
Individual 2.5 .84 6.8 .0053 0.477 6.02 13.32 
Unrestricted        
10%        
Collective 2.5 .94 33.0 .0046 0.550 1.43 15.35 
Fixed 2.5 .76 33.0 .0045 0.562 1.46 15.69 
Individual 2.5 .93 32.0 .0051 0.496 1.33 13.84 
Shared 10%a 2.5 .85 33.0 .0047 0.538 1.40 15.02 
100%        
Collective 2.5 .90 34.0 .0042 0.602 1.52 16.81 
Fixed 2.5 .76 34.0 .0041 0.617 1.56 17.22 
Individual 2.5 .86 49.0 .0058 0.436 0.76 12.17 
Shared 100%b 2.5 .77 40.0 .0049 0.516 1.11 14.41 
Shared Unrestrictedc 2.5 .80 36.0 .0048 0.527 1.26 14.71 
aSingle best-fit curve fitting three conditions in Restricted-10%.  bSingle best-fit curve fitting 
three conditions in Unrestricted 100%. cSingle best-fit curve fitting all six conditions for 







Experiment 2 Participant Demographic Characteristics  
Demographic n 











Black/African American 0 
Hispanic/Latino 1 
Asian 1 






Disability Typea  
Learning Disability 1 
ADHD 3 
Physical Disability 0 
Other 1 
English as first language  
Yes 24 
No 0 





Experiment 2 Team Composition  
Team Participant Age Gender Earnings 
R1 
 
1 20 Male $31.90 
2 19 Male $25.60 
3 19 Female $20.80 
R2 
1 19 Female $17.30 
2 19 Female $25.30 
3 18 Female $19.60 
R3 
1 18 Female $17.50 
2 20 Female $15.10 
3 18 Female $17.50 
R4 
1 21 Female $22.20 
2 18 Female $22.40 
3 18 Female $21.80 
UR1 
1 18 Female $24.30 
2 22 Male $24.50 
3 18 Female $20.80 
UR2 
1 18 Female $24.80 
2 19 Female $17.20 
3 21 Male $21.20 
UR3 
1 19 Female $27.70 
2 18 Female $25.90 
3 18 Female $19.70 
UR4 
1 18 Female $19.40 
2 18 Female $19.80 
3 21 Female $16.00 






Experiment 2 Occurrence of Intrateam Communication 
Team Pre-trial Within-trial Total 
R1 0 1 1 
R2 0 0 0 
R3 2 0 2 
R4 1 1 2 
Restricted Total 3 2 5 
    
UR1 0 0 0 
UR2 5 0 5 
UR3 5 8 13 
UR4 0 0 0 






Experiment 2 Aggregates 
Condition n Mdn 95% CIa Normal Dist.B U p d 
 Barrier Reveals 
Communication     1116 .794 0.05 
Restricted 48 14.0 [9, 19] No    
Unrestricted 48 18.0 [7, 33] No    
Incentive Type     759 .004 0.62 
Fixed 48 23.5 [12, 42] No    
Individual 48 10.5 [5, 17] No    
 Score 
Communication     1103 .719 0.07 
Restricted 48 68.0 [63, 80] Yes    
Unrestricted 48 74.0 [66, 81] Yes    
Incentive Type     857.5 .031 0.45 
Fixed 48 66.5 [54, 74] Yes    
Individual 48 75.5 [68, 87] Yes    
a95% confidence interval of the median.  bD’Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test (α = .05). 




Experiment 2 Demand Parameters and Metrics 
Curve k R2 Q0 α EV Pmax Omax 
Communication        
Restricted 1.4 .98 9.0 .0270 0.224 1.90 5.19 
Unrestricted 1.4 .99 8.3 .0210 0.287 2.65 6.68 
Incentive Type        
Fixed 1.9 .99 10.0 .0100 0.382 3.08 9.66 
Individual 1.9 .99 7.3 .0340 0.112 1.24 2.84 
Communication x Incentive        
Restricted-Fixed 2.7 .99 9.8 .0080 0.282 2.51 8.10 
Restricted-Individual 2.7 .96 7.5 .0210 0.107 1.25 3.09 
Unrestricted-Fixed 2.7 .98 9.9 .0059 0.382 3.37 10.98 
Unrestricted-Individual 2.7 .98 6.4 .0220 0.102 1.40 2.95 
Shared Individuala 2.7 .97 6.9 .0220 0.102 1.30 2.95 










Figure 2.  Experiment 1 trial totals with bars indicating median and 95% confidence interval (CI) 
of median for restricted and unrestricted conditions.  The y-axes depict total barrier reveals (top 





Figure 3.  Experiment 1 trial totals with bars indicating median and 95% CI of median for 
restricted (left panels) and unrestricted (right panels) teams in the 10% and 100% conditions.  





Figure 4.  Experiment 1 trial totals and with bars indicating median and 95% CI of median for 
the restricted (left panels) and unrestricted (right panels) teams in the collective, fixed, and 





Figure 5.  Experiment 1 mean barrier reveals at each price of cooperation with best-fit demand 
curves for each incentive type in the 10% (top panel) and 100% (bottom panel) conditions for the 




Figure 6.  Experiment 1 mean barrier reveals at each price of cooperation with aggregate shared 
best-fit demand curves (and shaded 95% confidence bands) in the 10% (top panel) and 100% 
(bottom panel) conditions for the unrestricted team.  Vertical lines correspond to derived Pmax for 




Figure 7.  Experiment 1 mean barrier reveals at each price of cooperation with aggregate shared 
best-fit demand curve (and shaded 95% confidence band) for the unrestricted team under all 





Figure 8.  Experiment 2 trial totals with bars indicating median and 95% CI of median for fixed 
and individual conditions across all teams.  Teams R1-R4 are on the top half, teams UR1-UR4 are 
on the bottom half.  The y-axes depict total barrier reveals (rows 1 and 3) and score (rows 2 and 





Figure 9.  Experiment 2 trial totals with bars indicating median and 95% CI of median for all 
teams in the restricted and unrestricted conditions.  The y-axes depict total barrier reveals (top 




Figure 10.  Experiment 2 trial totals with bars indicating median and 95% CI of median for all 
teams in fixed and individual conditions.  The y-axes depict team total barrier reveals (top panel) 




Figure 11.  Experiment 2 mean (and 95% CI of M) barrier reveals at each price of cooperation 
with best-fit demand curves (and shaded 95% confidence bands) for the restricted and 
unrestricted (top panel) and fixed and individual (bottom panel) conditions.  Vertical lines 




Figure 12.  Experiment 2 mean (and 95% CI of M) barrier reveals at each price of cooperation 
with best-fit demand curves (and shaded 95% confidence bands) for each condition combination.  





Figure 13.  Experiment 2 mean (and 95% CI of M) barrier reveals at each price of cooperation 
with aggregate shared best-fit demand curve (and shaded 95% confidence bands) for restricted- 






Participant recruitment script. 
 
“The purpose of the study is to evaluate the effects of several incentive systems on 
your performance on a group work task. Participants will be asked to complete a 
game for 3 minutes at a time, for one 90-minute visit to our lab. Sessions will consist 
of three participants completing the game at the same time and in the same room. 
During the course of the study, you will be exposed to a variety of incentive 
arrangements. In exchange for participation, participants will be paid $10 for 
attending plus any incentives they earn during the course of the study. In order to 





Session room arrangement.  
 
 
Note: Shaded rectangles represent tables, circles indicate where each participant was seated.  





Screenshot of the COHESION Gameplay.   
 
 
Note: Labels are added to indicate a resource, barrier reveal, target zone, and score panel with 
points. Barriers that appear black are not visible to teammates. The yellow circle indicates that 
the barrier is in the process of being revealed; once revealed barriers will turn pink. Time 






















































COHESION gameplay information sheet.  
Note: For Experiment 2, participants received this document with collective incentive and 




Sample participant in-session tracking log. 
Note: Participants in Experiment 2 received a tracking log that was similar but without the 














R1 R2 R3 R4 UR1 UR2 UR3 UR4
1 Individual Fixed Individual Fixed Individual Individual Fixed Fixed
2 Fixed Individual Fixed Individual Fixed Fixed Individual Individual
3 Fixed Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Fixed
4 Individual Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Individual
5 Fixed Individual Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Fixed Individual
6 Individual Fixed Individual Individual Individual Individual Individual Fixed
7 Fixed Individual Fixed Individual Individual Fixed Individual Fixed
8 Individual Fixed Individual Fixed Fixed Individual Fixed Individual
9 Individual Fixed Fixed Fixed Individual Individual Individual Fixed
10 Fixed Individual Individual Individual Fixed Fixed Fixed Individual
11 Individual Individual Individual Individual Fixed Individual Fixed Individual






Sample procedural integrity and communication data sheet.  
 
